Guidelines for the President\u27s Legal Advisors (including  Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel  ) by Johnsen, Dawn E.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 81 | Issue 4 Article 11
Fall 2006
Guidelines for the President's Legal Advisors
(including "Principles to Guide the Office of Legal
Counsel ")
Dawn E. Johnsen
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, djohnsen@indiana.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Law and Politics Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons,
and the Legal Profession Commons
This Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Law
School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Johnsen, Dawn E. (2006) "Guidelines for the President's Legal Advisors (including "Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel
")," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 81: Iss. 4, Article 11.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol81/iss4/11
Guidelines for the President's Legal Advisors
INTRODUCTON*
At the outset of the twenty-first century, the President's constitutional and statutory
powers are the subject of serious controversy among political leaders, legal academics,
the American public, and the international community alike. The "war on terror," that
followed the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in particular has brought assertions
of new and expansive presidential authority regarding enemy combatants, military
tribunals, preemptive self-defense and warrantless domestic wiretaps, torture and other
extreme interrogation techniques. Each assertion raises new variations on enduring
questions about the Constitution's allocation of governmental power and the
protections it affords individuals from governmental abuses, as well as about how
constitutional principles should affect the interpretation of federal statutes that purport
to constrain governmental authority.
Unchanging, however, and essential to understanding presidential power, is the
President's overriding obligation to exercise executive authority in conformity with the
law. Presidents are not constrained merely by whatever checks Congress and the courts
might impose; congressional oversight and judicial review by their nature provide only
limited safeguards against presidential abuse. Rather, the constitutional text and
structure, as well as longstanding practice, affirmatively obligate Presidents to ensure
that their actions comply with all relevant constitutional, statutory, and other legal
requirements. On assuming office, Presidents must take an oath to "preserve, protect
and defend the Constitution."' Presidents also must "take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.",2 And to uphold the Constitution and faithfully execute the laws,
Presidents need good legal advice.
From our nation's earliest days, Presidents have recognized their need for legal
counsel. George Washington turned to the Supreme Court, and the Court appropriately
directed him back to his own executive branch officers.3 Ever since, Presidents have
turned for legal guidance to the Attorney General and, in later years, the Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC), to which the Attorney General has delegated the advice-giving
function. OLC advises the President and the executive branch agencies on the great-
as well as the arcane-legal controversies of the day, from war powers, abortion, and
school prayer to the appointments clause and the Anti-Deficiency Act. Within the
executive branch, OLC's legal interpretations are controlling and executive branch
action must conform to it (unless overridden by the Attorney General or President, a
rare event).4
* Introduction by Dawn E. Johnsen, Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-
Bloomington.
1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
2. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
3. RICHARD H. FA.LON, JR., DANIELJ. MELTzER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 78-79 (5th ed. 2003).
4. For discussions of the Office of Legal Counsel, and more generally, executive branch
constitutional interpretation, see Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism & Nonjudicial
Interpretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105
(Summer 2004); Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A Perspective from
the Office of Legal Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1303 (2000); Cornelia Pillard, The Unfulfilled
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The document that follows this introduction, Principles to Guide the Office of Legal
Counsel (hereinafter "OLC Guidelines"), proposes ten basic principles that should
guide OLC when it provides legal advice to the President and executive branch
officers.5 Nineteen former OLC lawyers authored the OLC Guidelines, the substance of
which requires no further elaboration. Some background, however, on what inspired
the drafting of the document may be of interest to those seeking to understand and
apply the ten principles.
OLC typically does its work in relative obscurity. Indeed, few outside the
government and legal academia have paid any sustained attention to what OLC does-
that is, until the summer of 2004, when an unidentified source leaked to The
Washington Post what has come to be known as the infamous "OLC Torture
Opinion." 6 A couple of months earlier, in April 2004, photographs and descriptions of
horrific prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, an Iraqi prison under U.S. military control,
flooded the media in the United States and around the world. American soldiers had
photographed each other as they physically, psychologically, and sexually abused Iraqi
detainees. The abuse in some instances undoubtedly constituted torture. The Army
reported in March 2006 that since October 2001 it had investigated more than 600
complaints of detainee abuse in Iraq and Afghanistan and had punished 251 soldiers
for misconduct related to prisoners.7
The Bush administration successfully kept secret the OLC Torture Opinion, dated
August 1, 2002, for almost two years, until someone leaked it to the press in the
immediate wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal. In it, OLC advised the Bush
administration about the types of actions that, in its view, would-and, more to the
point, would not-violate the federal statute criminalizing the use of torture by
government personnel. In short, the memo interpreted the federal anti-torture statute so
as to render it largely ineffective in prohibiting highly coercive forms of interrogation
that Congress clearly intended to reach, and entirely ineffective where the President
authorized the coercive interrogations in furtherance of his authority as Commander in
Chief.8 OLC concluded, for example, that under the statute "[pihysical pain amounting
Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REv. 676 (2005); Symposium,
Executive Branch Interpretation of the Law, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 21 (1993).
5. See also Dawn Johnsen & Neil Kinkopf, How to Prevent Another "Torture" Memo,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2005, at A9; Douglas W. Kmiec, Wise Counsel, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2005,
at A1O.
6. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of
Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter OLC
Torture Opinion], available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/
dojinterrogationmemo2002O801 .pdf.
7. Eric Schmitt, Iraq Abuse Trial Is Again Limited to Lower Ranks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
2006, at Al.
8. The memorandum's analysis appears to be addressed, not primarily at the U.S. military
(which must adhere as well to the Uniform Code of Military Justice), but at coercive
interrogations by Central Intelligence Agency personnel. References elsewhere to a second
OLC memorandum dated March 14, 2003, which the Bush administration continues to refuse to
disclose, suggest that this later memorandum might apply the same expansive view of the
President's Commander-in-Chief authority to allow highly coercive interrogations by the
military that otherwise would violate the federal anti-torture statute, the federal assault statute,
and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
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to torture must be equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical
injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death."9 And even
interrogators who used such extreme measures, the memo argued, could protect
themselves from conviction by asserting the versions of self-defense and the necessity
defense that the memo developed. Finally, the memo concluded that "any effort to
apply [the statute] in a manner that interferes with the President's direction of such
core war matters as the detention and interrogation of enemy combatants... would be
unconstitutional."' 0 An interagency working group established by Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld incorporated advice from the OLC Torture Opinion in its April 4,
2003 final report, adopting verbatim OLC's conclusion that the anti-torture statute
"does not apply to the President's detention and interrogation of enemy combatants
pursuant to his Commander-in-Chief authority.""
OLC's legal analysis was harshly and almost universally condemned. New York
Times columnist Anthony Lewis colorfully exemplifies the tenor of the criticism: "The
memo reads like the advice of a mob lawyer to a mafia don on how to skirt the law and
stay out of prison. Avoiding prosecution is literally a theme of the memorandum."
' z
Critics cited the opinion's analysis and conclusions with regard to the meaning of the
anti-torture statute, the self-defense and necessity defenses, and the scope of the
President's Commander-in-Chief power.
Under intense pressure, the White House sought to distance itself from both the
opinion and the abuses at Abu Ghraib, with frequent statements from the President and
other administration officials that condemned the use of torture. In December 2004,
OLC issued a legal opinion that formally superseded the August 2002 analysis and that
substituted a far more careful and defensible statutory analysis.' 3 The new opinion,
however, did not address the scope of the President's commander in chief power or
disavow the earlier analysis of that power, except to say that it had been "unnecessary"
and therefore had "been eliminated."' 4 Subsequent events suggest that the Bush
administration contrives to adhere to the original OLC Torture Opinion's view of
presidential power, including the limits it described on Congress's ability to constrain
the President. For example, a January 19, 2006, unsigned memorandum, issued on
Department of Justice letterhead, relied upon a similar expansive and controversial
view of presidential power to justify the use of warrantless domestic wiretaps in
seeming contravention of the federal statutory safeguards imposed by the Foreign
9. OLC Torture Opinion, supra note 6, at 1.
10. Id. at 31.
11. Id. at 35; DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE
INTERROGATIONS IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL,
POLICY, AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 21 (April 4, 2003).
12. Anthony Lewis, Making Torture Legal, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, July 15, 2004, at 4.
13. Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, Re: Legal
Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Dec. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm.
14. Id.; see also id. at n.8 ("While we have identified various disagreements with the
August 2002 Memorandum, we have reviewed this Office's prior opinions addressing issues
involving treatment of detainees and do not believe that any of their conclusions would be
different under the standards set forth in this memorandum.").
13472006]
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Intelligence Surveillance Act.15 Also, when signing into law new statutory limits on
highly coercive interrogations, President Bush signaled his continued belief that in
some circumstances he possesses the constitutional authority to ignore the new
statutory limits. President Bush wrote that he would enforce the statute "in a manner
consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary
executive branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional
limitations on the judicial power."' 16
The OLC Guidelines that follow are a product of concerns initially raised by the
OLC Torture Opinion, but do not include any analysis or criticism specific to it. We,
the signatories, decided that the most appropriate and potentially beneficial joint
response from former OLC attorneys would be forward-looking and address OLC's
institutional role. Rather than detail the deficiencies of one extraordinarily problematic
opinion, we would describe the standards and processes that we believe would help
prevent future recurrences. Our principal aim is to restore and secure the vital role
OLC traditionally has played in promoting presidential adherence to the rule of law.
We feel privileged to have served at OLC and proud of both the work we did there and
the traditional reputation of the office. We wish to promote its future effectiveness and
success, in Democratic and Republican administrations alike. We therefore set out to
describe what we believe to be the best practices of OLC, drawn from "the
longstanding practices of the Attorney General and the Office of Legal Counsel, across
time and administrations."' 7 We publish the results here, in the hope that these ten
principles will inform the legal advice that guides the actions of Presidents and
executive branch officers for decades to come.
Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel
DECEMBER 21, 2004
The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) is the Department of Justice component to
which the Attorney General has delegated the function of providing legal advice to
guide the actions of the President and the agencies of the executive branch. OLC's
legal determinations are considered binding on the executive branch, subject to the
supervision of the Attorney General and the ultimate authority of the President. From
the outset of our constitutional system, Presidents have recognized that compliance
with their constitutional obligation to act lawfully requires a reliable source of legal
15. Memorandum from U.S. Dep't of Justice, Re: Legal Authorities Supporting the
Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President (Jan. 19,2006), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf.
16. Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act,
2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1918, 1919 (Dec. 30, 2005).




advice. In 1793, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, writing on behalf of President
Washington, requested the Supreme Court's advice regarding the United States' treaty
obligations with regard to the war between Great Britain and France. The Supreme
Court declined the request, in important measure on the grounds that the Constitution
vests responsibility for such legal determinations within the executive branch itself:
"[T]he three departments of government... being in certain respects checks upon each
other, and our being judges of a court in the last resort, are considerations which afford
strong arguments against the propriety of our extrajudicially deciding the questions
alluded to, especially as the power given by the Constitution to the President, of calling
on the heads of departments for opinions seems to have been purposely as well as
expressly united to the executive departments." Letter from John Jay to George
Washington, August 8, 1793, quoted in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 258 (Philip
B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner, eds. 1987).
From the Washington Administration through the present, Attorneys General, and in
recent decades the Office of Legal Counsel, have served as the source of legal
determinations regarding the executive's legal obligations and authorities. The
resulting body of law, much of which is published in volumes entitled Opinions of the
Attorney General and Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel, offers powerful
testimony to the importance of the rule-of-law values that President Washington
sought to secure and to the Department of Justice's profound tradition of respect for
the rule of law. Administrations of both political parties have maintained this tradition,
which reflects a dedication to the rule of law that is as significant and as important to
the country as that shown by our courts. As a practical matter, the responsibility for
preserving this tradition cannot rest with OLC alone. It is incumbent upon the Attorney
General and the President to ensure that OLC's advice is sought on important and close
legal questions and that the advice given reflects the best executive branch traditions.
The principles set forth in this document are based in large part on the longstanding
practices of the Attorney General and the Office of Legal Counsel, across time and
administrations.
1. When providing legal advice to guide contemplated executive branch action,
OLC should provide an accurate and honest appraisal of applicable law, even if that
advice will constrain the administration's pursuit of desired policies. The advocacy
model of lawyering, in which lawyers craft merely plausible legal arguments to
support their clients' desired actions, inadequately promotes the President's
constitutional obligation to ensure the legality of executive action.
OLC's core function is to help the President fulfill his constitutional duty to uphold
the Constitution and "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" in all of the varied
work of the executive branch. OLC provides the legal expertise necessary to ensure the
lawfulness of presidential and executive branch action, including contemplated action
that raises close and difficult questions of law. To fulfill this function appropriately,
OLC must provide advice based on its best understanding of what the law requires.
OLC should not simply provide an advocate's best defense of contemplated action that
OLC actually believes is best viewed as unlawful. To do so would deprive the
President and other executive branch decisionmakers of critical information and,
worse, mislead them regarding the legality of contemplated action. OLC's tradition of
principled legal analysis and adherence to the rule of law thus is constitutionally
grounded and also best serves the interests of both the public and the presidency, even
20061 1349
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though OLC at times will determine that the law precludes an action that a President
strongly desires to take.
2. OLC's advice should be thorough and forthright, and it should reflect all legal
constraints, including the constitutional authorities of the coordinate branches of the
federal government-the courts and Congress-and constitutional limits on the
exercise of governmental power.
The President is constitutionally obligated to "preserve, protect and defend" the
Constitution in its entirety-not only executive power, but also judicial and
congressional power and constitutional limits on governmental power-and to enforce
federal statutes enacted in accordance with the Constitution. OLC's advice should
reflect all relevant legal constraints. In addition, regardless of OLC's ultimate legal
conclusions concerning whether proposed executive branch action lawfully may
proceed, OLC's analysis should disclose, and candidly and fairly address, the relevant
range of legal sources and substantial arguments on all sides of the question.
3. OLC's obligation to counsel compliance with the law, and the insufficiency of
the advocacy model, pertain with special force in circumstances where OLC's advice
is unlikely to be subject to review by the courts.
In formulating its best view of what the law requires, OLC always should be
mindful that the President's legal obligations are not limited to those that are judicially
enforceable. In some circumstances, OLC's advice will guide executive branch action
that the courts are unlikely to review (for example, action unlikely to result in a
justiciable case or controversy) or that the courts likely will review only under a
standard of extreme deference (for example, some questions regarding war powers and
national security). OLC's advice should reflect its best view of all applicable legal
constraints, and not only legal constraints likely to lead to judicial invalidation of
executive branch action. An OLC approach that instead would equate "lawful" with
"likely to escape judicial condemnation" would ill serve the President's constitutional
duty by failing to describe all legal constraints and by appearing to condone unlawful
action as long as the President could, in a sense, get away with it. Indeed, the absence
of a litigation threat signals special need for vigilance: In circumstances in which
judicial oversight of executive branch action is unlikely, the President-and by
extension OLC-has a special obligation to ensure compliance with the law, including
respect for the rights of affected individuals and the constitutional allocation of powers.
4. OLC's legal analyses, and its processes for reaching legal determinations,
should not simply mirror those of the federal courts, but also should reflect the
institutional traditions and competencies of the executive branch as well as the views
of the President who currently holds office.
As discussed under principle 3, jurisdictional and prudential limitations do not
constrain OLC as they do courts, and thus in some instances OLC appropriately
identifies legal limits on executive branch action that a court would not require.
Beyond this, OLC's work should reflect the fact that OLC is located in the executive
branch and serves both the institution of the presidency and a particular incumbent,
democratically elected President in whom the Constitution vests the executive power.
1350 [Vol. 81:1345
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What follows from this is addressed as well under principle 5. The most substantial
effects include the following: OLC typically adheres to judicial precedent, but that
precedent sometimes leaves room for executive interpretive influences, because
doctrine at times genuinely is open to more than one interpretation and at times
contemplates an executive branch interpretive role. Similarly, OLC routinely, and
appropriately, considers sources and understandings of law and fact that the courts
often ignore, such as previous Attorney General and OLC opinions that themselves
reflect the traditions, knowledge and expertise of the executive branch. Finally, OLC
differs from a court in that its responsibilities include facilitating the work of the
executive branch and the objectives of the President, consistent with the requirements
of the law. OLC therefore, where possible and appropriate, should recommend lawful
alternatives to legally impermissible executive branch proposals. Notwithstanding
these and other significant differences between the work of OLC and the courts, OLC's
legal analyses always should be principled, thorough, forthright, and not merely
instrumental to the President's policy preferences.
5. OLC advice should reflect due respect for the constitutional views of the courts
and Congress (as well as the President). On the very rare occasion when the executive
branch-usually on the advice of OLC-declines fully to follow a federal statutory
requirement, it typically should publicly disclose its justification.
OLC's tradition of general adherence to judicial (especially Supreme Court)
precedent and federal statutes reflects appropriate executive branch respect for the
coordinate branches of the federal government. On very rare occasion, however,
Presidents, often with the advice of OLC, appropriately act on their own understanding
of constitutional meaning (just as Congress at times enacts laws based on its own
constitutional views). To begin with relatively uncontroversial examples, Presidents at
times veto bills they believe are unconstitutional and pardon individuals for violating
what Presidents believe are unconstitutional statutes, even when the Court would
uphold the statute or the conviction against constitutional challenge. Far more
controversial are rare cases in which Presidents decide to refuse to enforce or
otherwise comply with laws they deem unconstitutional, either on their face or in some
applications. The precise contours of presidential power in such contexts are the
subject of some debate and beyond the scope of this document. The need for
transparency regarding interbranch disagreements, however, should be beyond dispute.
At a bare minimum, OLC advice should fully address applicable Supreme Court
precedent, and, absent the most compelling need for secrecy, any time the executive
branch disregards a federal statutory requirement on constitutional grounds, it should
publicly release a clear statement explaining its deviation. Absent transparency and
clarity, client agencies might experience difficulty understanding and applying such
legal advice, and the public and Congress would be unable adequately to assess the
lawfulness of executive branch action. Indeed, federal law currently requires the
Attorney General to notify Congress if the Department of Justice determines either that
it will not enforce a provision of law on the grounds that it is unconstitutional or that it
will not defend a provision of law against constitutional challenge.
6. OLC should publicly disclose its written legal opinions in a timely manner,
absent strong reasons for delay or nondisclosure.
2006] 1351
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OLC should follow a presumption in favor of timely publication of its written legal
opinions. Such disclosure helps to ensure executive branch adherence to the rule of law
and guard against excessive claims of executive authority. Transparency also promotes
confidence in the lawfulness of governmental action. Making executive branch law
available to the public also adds an important voice to the development of
constitutional meaning-in the courts as well as among academics, other commentators,
and the public more generally-and a particularly valuable perspective on legal issues
regarding which the executive branch possesses relevant expertise. There nonetheless
will exist some legal advice that properly should remain confidential, most notably,
some advice regarding classified and some other national security matters. OLC should
consider the views regarding disclosure of the client agency that requested the advice.
Ordinarily, OLC should honor a requestor's desire to keep confidential any OLC
advice that the proposed executive action would be unlawful, where the requestor then
does not take the action. For OLC routinely to release the details of all contemplated
action of dubious legality might deter executive branch actors from seeking OLC
advice at sufficiently early stages in policy formation. In all events, OLC should in
each administration consider the circumstances in which advice should be kept
confidential, with a presumption in favor of publication, and publication policy and
practice should not vary substantially from administration to administration. The values
of transparency and accountability remain constant, as do any existing legitimate
rationales for secret executive branch law. Finally, as discussed in principle 5,
Presidents, and by extension OLC, bear a special responsibility to disclose publicly and
explain any actions that conflict with federal statutory requirements.
7. OLC should maintain internal systems and practices to help ensure that OLC's
legal advice is of the highest possible quality and represents the best possible view of
the law.
OLC systems and processes can help maintain high legal standards, avoid errors,
and safeguard against tendencies toward potentially excessive claims of executive
authority. At the outset, OLC should be careful about the form of requests for advice.
Whenever possible, agency requests should be in writing, should include the requesting
agency's own best legal views as well as any relevant materials and information, and
should be as specific as circumstances allow. Where OLC determines that advice of a
more generally applicable nature would be helpful and appropriate, it should take
special care to consider the implications for its advice in all foreseeable potential
applications. Also, OLC typically should provide legal advice in advance of executive
branch action, and not regarding executive branch action that already has occurred;
legal "advice" after the fact is subject to strong pressures to follow an advocacy model,
which is an appropriate activity for some components of the Department of Justice but
not usually for OLC (though this tension may be unavoidable in some cases involving
continuing or potentially recurring executive branch action). OLC should recruit and
retain attorneys of the highest integrity and abilities. OLC should afford due respect for
the precedential value of OLC opinions from administrations of both parties; although
OLC's current best view of the law sometimes will require repudiation of OLC
precedent, OLC should never disregard precedent without careful consideration and
detailed explanation. Ordinarily OLC legal advice should be subject to multiple layers
of scrutiny and approval; one such mechanism used effectively at times is a "two
deputy rule" that requires at least two supervising deputies to review and clear all OLC
[Vol. 81:13451352
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advice. Finally, OLC can help promote public confidence and understanding by
publicly announcing its general operating policies and procedures.
8. Whenever time and circumstances permit, OLC should seek the views of all
affected agencies and components of the Department of Justice before rendering final
advice.
The involvement of affected entities serves as an additional check against erroneous
reasoning by ensuring that all views and relevant information are considered.
Administrative coordination allows OLC to avail itself of the substantive expertise of
the various components of the executive branch and to avoid overlooking potentially
important consequences before rendering advice. It helps to ensure that legal
pronouncements will have no broader effect than necessary to resolve the question at
hand. Finally, it allows OLC to respond to all serious arguments and thus avoid the
need for reconsideration.
9. OLC should strive to maintain good working relationships with its client
agencies, and especially the White House Counsel's Office, to help ensure that OLC is
consulted, before the fact, regarding any and all substantial executive branch action
of questionable legality.
Although OLC's legal determinations should not seek simply to legitimate the
policy preferences of the administration of which it is a part, OLC must take account of
the administration's goals and assist their accomplishment within the law. To operate
effectively, OLC must be attentive to the need for prompt, responsive legal advice that
is not unnecessarily obstructionist. Thus, when OLC concludes that an administration
proposal is impermissible, it is appropriate for OLC to go on to suggest modifications
that would cure the defect, and OLC should stand ready to work with the
administration to craft lawful alternatives. Executive branch officials nonetheless may
be tempted to avoid bringing to OLC's attention strongly desired policies of
questionable legality. Structures, routines and expectations should ensure that OLC is
consulted on all major executive branch initiatives and activities that raise significant
legal questions. Public attention to when and how OLC generally functions within a
particular administration also can help ensure appropriate OLC involvement.
10. OLC should be clear whenever it intends its advice to fall outside of OLC's
typical role as the source of legal determinations that are binding within the executive
branch.
OLC sometimes provides legal advice that is not intended to inform the formulation
of executive branch policy or action, and in some such circumstances an advocacy
model may be appropriate. One common example: OLC sometimes assists the Solicitor
General and the litigating components of the Department of Justice in developing
arguments for presentation to a court, including in the defense of congressional
statutes. The Department of Justice typically follows a practice of defending an act of
Congress against constitutional challenge as long as a reasonable argument can be
made in its defense (even if that argument is not the best view of the law). In this
context, OLC appropriately may employ advocacy-based modes of analysis. OLC
should ensure, however, that all involved understand whenever OLC is acting outside
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of its typical stance, and that its views in such cases should not be taken as
authoritative, binding advice as to the executive branch's legal obligations. Client
agencies expect OLC to provide its best view of applicable legal constraints and if
OLC acts otherwise without adequate warning, it risks prompting unlawful executive
branch action.
The following former Office of Legal Counsel attorneys prepared and endorse this
document:
Walter E. Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General 1993-96
Dawn Johnsen, Acting Assistant Attorney General 1997-98; Deputy AAG 1993-97
Randolph Moss, Assistant Attorney General 2000-01, Acting 1998-2000; Deputy
AAG 1996-98
Christopher Schroeder, Acting Assistant Attorney General 1997; Deputy AAG 1994-
96
Joseph R. Guerra, Deputy Assistant Attorney General 1999-2001
Beth Nolan, Deputy Assistant Attorney General 1996-99; Attorney Advisor 1981-85
Todd Peterson, Deputy Assistant Attorney General 1997-99; Attorney Advisor 1982-
85
Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General 1998-2000
H. Jefferson Powell, Deputy Assistant Attorney General and Consultant 1993-2000
Teresa Wynn Roseborough, Deputy Assistant Attorney General 1994-96
Richard Shiffrin, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 1993-97
William Michael Treanor, Deputy Assistant Attorney General 1998-2001
David Barron, Attorney Advisor 1996-99
Stuart Benjamin, Attorney Advisor 1992-95
Lisa Brown, Attorney Advisor 1996-97
Pamela Harris, Attorney Advisor 1993-96
Neil Kinkopf, Attorney Advisor 1993-97
Martin Lederman, Attorney Advisor 1994-2002
Michael Small, Attorney Advisor 1993-96
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